APPROACHES TO POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT

Lessons from Southeast Asia

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Cover image: United Nations peacekeepers supervising children in East Timor (Howard 2013, p. 2)

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAR	Central African Republic
CDD	Community-Driven Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FCS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations
FSP	Fragile State Principle
IDPS	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IID	Institute for International Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN	United Nations
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the culmination of an internship undertaken at the Institute for International Development (IID) as part of the Arts Internship at the University of Adelaide. It presents a review of different approaches to post-conflict development. The purpose of the report is to assist the IID with future development projects in Myanmar, helping frame their current and past work against development rhetoric and practice.

METHOD

The report sources from academic journals and books, policy documents, and news coverage of policy implementation from development organisation websites. Country-specific case studies are chosen from primarily Southeast Asia. These countries have histories of ethnic-fuelled conflict, high-minority populations, and close geographical proximity, chosen to better reflect the discussion's relevancy to Myanmar. International development organisations and policy creators are assessed to gauge the effectiveness of their methods. Capacity building, governance, education and tourism are analysed. Through this research, a variety of approaches to post-conflict development are critiqued and contrasted to discern appropriate post-conflict methodologies for future use in Myanmar.

FINDINGS

Through the analysis of the development agencies, case studies and development rhetoric, the report offers the following key findings in the context of post-conflict development.

- The operational procedures and guiding principles used by the OECD, World Bank and IDPS are well founded in theory, yet hard to implement in practice. Despite this, many of their approaches and policies are useful when implemented correctly and viewed as a guide, rather than a set of rules.
- Extended conflict cessation and context appropriateness should be prioritised.
- Successful reconstruction requires early intervention, consistent funding and sustained long-term support.
- Economic growth should be prioritised over democratic reforms.
- Private-sector development is imperative for economic recovery.
- Existing institutions and systems should be strengthened to build capacity and state legitimacy.
- Community-driven development and participatory approaches have proven effectiveness in providing both economic and educational opportunities.
- Tourism has the potential to generate employment opportunities, strengthen the economy and foster peace. However, ethnic tourism can lead to culture deterioration.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are intended for use by the IID to assist them with future engagement in Myanmar.

- The IID should incorporate the Paris Declaration, FSPs and New Deal Principles into their future projects.
- Post-conflict development should prioritise maintaining ceasefire agreements and treat each development project as unique.
- Existing infrastructure, institutions, and forms of governance should be strengthened and built upon to facilitate capacity development and legitimacy.
- CDD and participatory development should be utilised to create employment opportunities and facilitate community governance, vocational skills, education and health provision.
- Development projects need to provide constant funding and sustained long-term support to increase their chances of success.
- Small-scale participatory tourism as shown in northern Thailand and Guizhou should be incorporated into future development projects.
- Further research should investigate minority development and the environment in post-conflict settings.

INTRODUCTION

Over one half of the world's least developed countries have suffered a major conflict since 1980, with 90 percent of wars now internalised (AusAID 2002). Poverty rates in conflict-affected countries are 20 percent higher than stable countries; see Figure 1 (AusAID 2011).

Figure 1: The widening poverty gap between stable and conflict-affected countries. (WB 2011, p.4)



Following an initial civil conflict, a country commonly enters a downward economic spiral that intensifies upon the conflict's conclusion. As economic collapse can be a precursor to conflict, the country then faces a heightened risk of further violence and the cycle renews itself. Collier et al. (2003) remarks upon this cycle of violence and poverty, referring to it as the 'poverty-conflict trap'. The risk of further conflict for countries emerging from civil war is almost twice as high than prior to the initial conflict (Collier et al. 2003). This cycle demonstrates the necessity of rapid post-conflict recovery to foster economic growth and state capacity, as state unresponsiveness, as depicted in Figure 2, can lead to conflict recidivism and economic deterioration, contributing to the cycle.

Figure 2: Diagram of the poverty-conflict trap (AusAID 2011a, p.15)



In 2004, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) became the first donor to adopt the phrasing of 'fragile states' and recognise the need for different development approaches in such contexts (Baranyi et al. 2012). According to the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) (2011, p.1), "fragile states are countries where the government has limited capacity, or will, to provide basic services and security to its citizens and the relationship between the government and its citizens is weak". Some key issues often attributed to fragile and conflict situations include: "chronic poverty; government and state structures lacking the capacity or will to provide public safety and security, and basic services for their populations; low levels of state accountability to citizens; challenges relating to natural resource management; a private sector which may be largely informal and opportunistic; low levels of foreign direct investment; and a high risk of further state decline" (AusAID 2011, p.3).

In their reconstruction attempts in post-conflict states, the development community has drawn heavily upon neo-liberal development paradigms; the constitution of free markets to stimulate economic growth in the private sector (Barbara 2008). Neo-liberalism has, however, had little proven positive effect upon post-conflict economic growth and state institutional building, leading many organisations and governments to reapproach the process. Neo-liberal approaches incorporating ideology such as "the right to make a profit, the universal good of free trade, the freedom of capital, the supremacy of private property, (and) the commoditisation of things including labour," were employed, for example, in post-conflict Timor-Leste (Blowfield 2005, p. 520). While Timor-Leste experienced strong economic growth in the decade following the UN's intervention, the benefits failed to trickle down to the poor, with the country continuing to suffer widespread poverty. In recognition of their shortcomings, the development community has adopted new frameworks, principles and methods to operating in post-conflict states. The purpose of this report is to evaluate these approaches and discern good development practice and policy.

This report is divided into five sections. The first section critiques the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Section two discusses the World Bank's experience in post-conflict reconstruction. Section three examines the New Deal and its implementation. Section four details post-conflict reconstruction in Timor-Leste, describing the efficacy of the United Nation's mandated recovery efforts. The final section investigates the use of tourism in a post-conflict setting. The report concludes that there is growing consensus as to what good development practice in a post-conflict setting should include. Development agency policy and examples of successful practice insinuate that good practice should focus on conflict cessation, context appropriateness, early intervention, long-term support, economic growth, community-driven development, and capacity development through strengthening local institutions and systems.

SECTION ONE

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is an international economic organisation. Founded in 1961, the organisation acts as a forum, through which member countries committed to democracy and market economies, work together to address the challenges of economic progress and globalisation (OECD 2010). A list of member countries is available in Appendix I. Each member country brings to the forum their experiences at the global stage, granting the organisation access to a vast pool of knowledge to address the economic, social and environmental aspects of globalisation (2010).

1.2 THE PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a department within the OECD designed to assist with aid and development policy construction (OECD 2010). A flagship policy created by the DAC is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration was adopted in 2005 by over 100 countries and aid agencies (OECD 2009). The Declaration defines the principles and commitments that signatories must adopt to ensure maximum aid effectiveness, as outlined by the five Partnership Principles (OECD 2009). The culmination of several previous agreements and policies, the Principles aim to ensure that only the best principles and practices in aid management are adopted (2009). In addition to the Paris Declaration, the OECD established the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), a policy tool designed to track progress and ensure donors undertake actions consistent with the Declaration (2009). For a more detailed description of the Paris Declaration and the AAA, see Appendix II.

In 2009, the OECD (2009) published a report titled, *Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration.* The report recognised the development disparities between pursuing economic development in fragile and stable states (OECD 2009). A key underpinning of the Paris Declaration is the Ownership Principle, the assumption that the government has effective control over its territory and a high degree of legitimacy (OECD 2009). The report recognises that fragile states often lack the aforementioned control and legitimacy, reducing their capacity to adhere to the Principles.

1.3 THE PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES AND SITUATIONS

In 2006, the OECD created the 'Principles for Good Economic Engagement in Fragile States and Situations' (FSPs). The FSPs are designed to accompany the Paris Declaration and AAA, to assist fragile states achieve economic recovery through the adoption of the most applicable and relevant methodologies (OECD 2010). AusAID endorse and use the

Principles to guide their work within fragile states. For more information about AusAID's approach to post-conflict development please see Appendix III.

1.3.1 IMPLEMENTATION

The 2011 report, *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't We Do Better?,* assesses the progress of the FSPs in each of the thirteen trialled countries (OECD 2011). It compares the success of each principle, describes difficulties faced, and provides recommendations (OECD 2011). The thirteen countries were Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo (OECD 2011). A comprehensive summary of the reports findings can be found in Appendix IV.

The report concludes that international stakeholder engagement is at least partially off-track for eight of the ten FSPs as demonstrated in Table 2 (OECD 2011).

Table 1: Implementation of the FSPs. Adapted from the OECD (2011, p.8)

Broadly On-Track	6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
Partly On-Track	7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
Partly Off-Track	1. Take context as the starting point
	3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
	4. Prioritise prevention
	5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives
Off-Track	2. Do no harm
	8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors
	9. Act fast . . . but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
	10. Avoid pockets of exclusion

Furthermore, the survey behind the report suggests that development partner practice has not improved significantly since implementation began (OECD 2011). The FSPs demonstrate the difference between policy and practice. While the FSPs may be well-founded, steeped in experience and well-intentioned policy, they have been proven

difficult to implement, suggesting stronger accountability measures are warranted, or that the FSPs need to be changed to better reflect realistic principles. It has been argued that they "were created by donors, for donors", thereby lacking the in-country experience needed to prescribe tailored solutions (Locke et al. 2012, p. 2).

Additionally, the report offers three major conclusions:

1. Donors need to ensure that the adoption of new policies at home translates into changes on the ground;
2. Traditional development frameworks, such as the Millennium Development Goals, fall short of the complexities in fragile states and need to be forsaken; and,
3. FSPs should be utilised to foster country-level dialogue and engagement concerning joint accountability frameworks (OECD 2011).

SECTION TWO

THE WORLD BANK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The World Bank, the world's largest international development bank, has recently made efforts to return to its original mandate, serving as an international bank for reconstruction following World War Two (Nooruddin et al. 2007). Since 2000, the World Bank, through the International Development Association (a subsidiary fund), has provided over US$22 billion in post-conflict reconstruction efforts (WB 2013). In 2012, the World Bank created the Center on Conflict, Security and Development to strengthen the Bank's work and research (WB 2013). Their deliberate re-engagement in fragile states over twenty years ago has contributed to successful recovery in multiple countries, as demonstrated in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.

2.1.1 NEPAL

After a decade of conflict, Nepal has regained economic functionality and succeeded in meeting the first Millennium Development Goal, to halve extreme poverty by 2015 (WB 2013). World Bank assistance in the country led to increased support for Nepal's decentralised institutions, bypassing the centralised political turmoil to provide assistance to the vulnerable (WB 2013). Programs supported by the World Bank have helped double full immunisation coverage rates, halve infant mortality, increase net primary school enrolment and achieve almost gender equity in secondary school attendance rates (WB 2013).

2.1.2 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

An example of good practice employed by the World Bank is in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH), with the independent Operations Evaluation Department deeming the reconstruction program to be "The bank at its best" (WB 2013a, p.1). The World Bank was pivotal in restoring infrastructure and basic services in BH following the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 (WB 2013a). Since post-conflict reconstruction began, BH has shown considerable economic and social progress, and commenced the integration process into the European Union (EU) (WB 2013a). Examples of practice that lead to sustainable results include:

- Reconstructing an old bridge in Mostar, leading to threefold tourist arrivals between 2004 and 2011;
- The revitalization of the forestry industry through the creation of new roads and tree planting;
- Training health care professionals;
- Job and microfinance programs providing 200 000 new jobs;
- Rehabilitation of the energy infrastructure through the creation of power lines, transmission stations, and thermo and hydro power plants (WB 2013a).

Although BH has experienced a relatively strong revitalisation process, it remains a young democracy that needs to overcome institutional and political setbacks to become an active and fertile market economy (WB 2013a). Using EU membership as the centrepiece of the partnership strategy, the World Bank is striving for economic competitiveness, service improvements for vulnerable groups and the sustainable use of national resources (WB 2013a). As of 2012, the World Bank has 12 projects active in BH totalling US$302.3 million (WB 2013a).

2.2 ACADEMIC CRITIQUE

While the World Bank conducts its own evaluations, there are few comprehensive external evaluations conducted concerning the World Bank's work in post-conflict states. One such evaluation was effected by Nooruddin et al. in 2007, whom argue that the key to successful economic recovery is commitment to peace by the former adversaries. A lack of trust between involved parties can lead to peace breakdowns that eventuate into conflict, further hampering the reconstruction process (Nooruddin et al. 2007). From this, they base their critique of the World Bank on two main factors: their ability to prevent countries receding into conflict, and whether they help foster economic growth. Their research also factored in the World's Banks disposition for selecting aid recipients with minimal probability of receding back into conflict. Controlling for the non-random selection, Nooruddin et al. (2007) found the World Bank to have no discernible effect upon either economic recovery or conflict recidivism.

Nooruddin et al. (2007) critique the process through which the World Bank promote democracy, often deliberately choosing to help democratic countries or countries in the transitional phase. Former studies by Nooruddin et al. discerned that demographic transitions impeded reconstruction. Similarly, Flores et al. (2009) in their analysis concluded that post-conflict democratisation retards recovery efforts. The World Bank weakens the effectiveness of the reconstruction process when it favours democratic reform over economic recovery, arguably its major weakness in post-conflict development.

2.3 PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES

In 1997, the World Bank created the *Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Nooruddin et al. 2007). Prior to the Framework's creation, post-conflict reconstruction programs followed standard operational policy (Nooruddin et al. 2007). The Nooruddin et al. (2007) study focused almost entirely on data and programs in place prior to 1997. Since the uptaking of the Framework the World Bank has changed the operational policies for engaging in post-conflict states.

Following the *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (WDR), the World Bank called for a "paradigm shift in the development community's approach to fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), based on the premise that violence and other challenges plaguing FCS cannot be resolved by short-term or partial

solutions in the absence of institutions that provide people with security, justice, and jobs" (WB 2013, p.1). To meet this challenge, the World Bank has committed to emphasizing justice, deepening partnerships, provide further assistance to addressing crime and violence, and improve effectiveness through targeted policies and progress monitoring (WB 2013a). The World Bank has expressed implications following the WDR in six themes, as summarised in Table 3. Additionally, through the WDR, the World Bank has developed five guiding principles for engagement in fragile states; see Appendix V. For further descriptions of World Bank policy mechanisms, refer to Appendix VI.

Table 2: WDR policy implications. Adapted from the World Bank (2011a, pp. iv-vi).

WDR Implication	Explanation
1. Making country strategies more fragility-focused	Approaches in fragile states should: a) Identify the stresses that can lead to conflict and violence; b) Assess institution deficits; c) Identify violence transition opportunities.
2. Strengthening partnerships on development, security, and justice	Success will require greater coordination with other partners and the following of the Paris Declaration and AAA.
3. Increasing attention to jobs and private sector development	Requires early support for public and community-based employment programs until private-sector employment accelerates. Increase private-sector investment.
4. Realigning results and risk management frameworks for FCS	Rethinking risk tolerances and risk management to allow for greater distribution of funds compared to past allocations.
5. Seeking less volatility in financing	Sustained long-term support for institutional development, at least over several years. No sharp withdrawals that could undermine governance.
6. Striving for global excellence in FCS work	Further research needs to be conducted and recruitment should focus on increased excellence.

2.4 COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA

A major component of World Bank assistance to post-conflict states is community-driven development (CDD). CDD projects ensure that communities have substantial control over project funds and the development process. This methodology grants the beneficiaries greater autonomy, resulting in more efficient and effective fund use, enhanced civic capacity, boosted state legitimacy and improved social relations (Barron 2011). CDD is becoming increasingly mainstreamed and widely adopted in post-conflict reconstruction. There were 17 active World Bank CDD programs in East Asia as of 2006 (Barron 2011). The World Bank uses a variety of mechanisms to address the complexities faced in a post-conflict setting, as summarised in Figure 3.

Figure 3: CDD mechanisms in post-conflict states (Barron 2011, p.12).



Analysis of CDD operations in East Asia by Barron (2011) shows that they effectively address sources of economic deprivation, helping reduce poverty levels. Furthermore, CDD operations have been proven to improve levels of trust and interaction (Barron et al. 2006), though not to the extent that the operations can be shown to definitively limit violent conflict and instability (Barron 2011). As a part of a national strategy, CDD in post-conflict East Asia has been proven flexible, cost-effective and more likely to be maintained (Barron 2011).

SECTION THREE

THE NEW DEAL

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In 2008 the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) was established in Accra, Ghana (OECD 2013b). The IDPS acts as a forum, bringing together countries affected by conflict and fragility to identify, create and implement policy to ease countries out of fragility and into economic prosperity (OECD 2013b). In response to limited progress implementing the Paris Declaration and the AAA, the IDPS has developed a new architecture for transitioning countries out of fragile contexts. Building upon previous declarations and policy documents, the IDPS, in association with the g7+ group of 19 fragile states and multiple development partners (including the World Bank, OECD DAC and the EU), has created the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (IDPS 2013), launched on November 30, 2011 (Locke et al. 2012).

The New Deal focuses on country leadership and ownership to counter previous policy failings that often bypassed national interests and actors at the expense of harmonisation and long-term sustainable results (IDPS 2013). The New Deal has been widely endorsed by the development community and is designed to build upon the Paris Declaration, AAA and DAC Fragile States Principles (IDPS 2013). As of 2013, the New Deal had begun piloting in Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste (IDPS 2013 and EU 2013), with donor governments, such as the United States and United Kingdom, monitoring the process (Mata 2013).

3.2 PRINCIPLES

There are three main components to the New Deal, as outlined below.

1. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals:
    - *Legitimate Politics*- foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;
    - *Security*- establish and strengthen people's security;
    - *Justice*- address injustices and increase people's access to justice;
    - *Economic Foundations*- generate employment and improve livelihoods;
    - *Revenues & Services*- manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery (IDPS 2013, p.2).

Each goal is accompanied by a set of indicators to track progress at the global and country-levels (IDPS 2013).

2. FOCUS- Supporting country owned and led pathways out of fragility

   Fragility Assessment: Periodic country-led assessment on the causes of conflict and sources of resilience will form the basis for a national vision and plan (IDPS 2013).

   One Vision, One Plan: A flexible national vision and plan will be created to address short, medium and long-term priorities (IDPS 2013).

   Compact: A compact between multiple stakeholders and the public will ensure harmonisation and donor co-ordination, efficiency and effectiveness (IDPS 2013).

   Use PSGs to Monitor: Country-level progress will be monitored by PSG targets and indicators (IDPS 2013).

   Support Political Dialogue and Leadership: There will be increased support for political dialogue, government capacity initiatives, and support targeted towards youth and women's political and leadership participation (IDPS 2013).

1. TRUST- result commitments

   Transparency: Ensure more transparent use of aid through monitoring and tracking against program goals (IDPS 2013).

   Risk Sharing: Recognise the risks of engaging during conflict transitions and create joint donor risk-mitigation strategies (IDPS 2013).

   Use and Strengthen Country Systems: Identify oversight and accountability measures to enhance confidence and use in country systems (IDPS 2013).

   Strengthen Capacities: Strengthen state and civil institutional capacity by increasing the available funds and utilizing external expert assistance (IDPS 2013).

   Timely and Predictable Aid: Use accountable fast-track financial management systems and procedures to improve aid speed and flexibility (IDPS 2013).

3.3 IMPLEMENTATION

One year after the launch, the EU (2013) has noted substantial implementation progress on behalf of partner governments and development partners. Five of the pilot countries have already conducted their fragility assessments. The EU has reiterated its support for the New Deal, adopting the principles into their programming and new Results Framework, while partnering with Somalia and Timor-Leste during their implementation process (EU 2013). Through their experience the EU believe the key for success is through donor co-operation, team building and joint-skills training (EU 2013).

The DRC, as a g7+ member, has committed to the New Deal. Their 2012 budget, however, has failed to address New Deal conditions regarding legitimacy, security and justice, while reports of rigged national elections and insecurity in eastern provinces further weaken the countries' resolve for successful implementation (Mata 2013). Although hoped the New Deal will force governments to be more transparent and enhance public trust, early indications from the DRC do not meet expectations.

According to Locke et al. (2012), many commentators are concerned that the New Deal process will be insufficient, exclusionary, and not taken seriously by government officials. Members are at risk of superimposing New Deal frameworks rather than creating context-based solutions (Locke et al. 2012). The New Deal faces numerous challenges that will require large efforts on behalf of the member governments. Despite this, Locke et al. (2012) praise the g7+ and International Dialogue, arguing that clear dialogue and planning should offset most issues and lead to successful implementation.

SECTION FOUR

TIMOR-LESTE

4. 1 INTRODUCTION

After a long-history of Portuguese and Indonesian colonisation, Timor-Leste became an independent state in 2002 following a UN-organised 1999 referendum (Margesson et al. 2009). The Indonesian colonial era, beginning in 1975, was marked as a period of brutal occupation and civil unrest, with between one-quarter to one-third of the population dying from fighting or famine, an estimated 100,000 - 250,000 deaths (Howard 2013a). The East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesian-rule, prompting pro-integrationist militia backed by Indonesia to rampage, destroying over 70 percent of the state's infrastructure, 80 percent of schools, almost all medical facilities, deporting thousands of civilians and killing over 1000 people (Margesson et al. 2009). Such was the extent of the destruction that Timor-Leste's economy is estimated to have contracted by a third (Rosser 2007). Beginning in 1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) provided unprecedented reconstruction assistance totalling US$2 billion in the form of military peacekeeping, governance and public administration, and humanitarian and emergency assistance (Howard 2013a).

Timor-Leste's gross domestic product has grown at over ten percent per year for the last ten years in the face of the Global Financial Crisis, indicating the return of strong economic growth, heavily assisted by the UN, World Bank and bi-lateral assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Japan and other countries (Howard 2013a). Since 2008 there has been a noted improvement in stability with successful fair elections taking place in 2012 (Howard 2013a). The Transition Support Program, implemented by the World Bank and other donors, contributed to national stability and successfully facilitated the transition to self-governance (Rosser 2007). Despite these successes, profits have failed to trickle-down to the poor, with the country still facing widespread poverty.

4.2 UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR

Reconstruction attempts in Timor-Leste were initially marred with "early blunders"; the UN has retrospectively admitted that the exclusion of local actors from the reconstruction process hindered capacity development and state legitimacy (2013a, p.14). UNTAET did not have any East Timorese on its staff, illogically defying its own accords for local participation (Millo et al. 2004). According to Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Acting Principal Legal Advisor to UNTAET from 1999-2000, "it quickly became apparent to UNTAET officials that a system of justice in Timor-Leste, including the necessary regulatory framework, first had to be built – and built within the shortest possible time – before it could be *administered* . . . never before has the UN had to construct, literally from the ground up, a fully functioning court system" (Hughes 2011). Strohmeyer describes the physical destruction of courtrooms and lack of applicable personnel as the main reasons behind the UN's decision (Hughes 2011). In their attempts to rebuild infrastructure, governmental capacity and judicial systems, the UN deliberately relied on international staff, a seemingly colonial approach that fostered discontent amongst the

East Timorese and perceptions of illegitimate governance. According to one critic, UNTAET had an early "preoccupation with control at the expense of the local community's involvement in government . . . project(ing) a blunt and bullying style rather than being accommodating and self-effacing" (Howard 2013a, p.14).

4.3 EDUCATION

Education contributes significantly to rebuilding post-conflict societies. It can help heal the psychological wounds of war, solve youth unemployment, deliver decentralisation and democracy, foster peace, and promote social and economic development (Buckland 2006). Education can, however, potentially contribute to conflict by exacerbating inequalities and polarising and excluding societal factions. Approaches to post-conflict education must be mindful of this effect and practice inclusionary methodologies. In the aftermath of conflict, education systems often lack funding and qualified teachers, are overwhelmed by uneducated young people, are debased by corruption and non-transparent governments, and lack coordination (Buckland 2006).

In the wake of Indonesia's violent withdrawal following the 1999 referendum, UNTAET had an important opportunity to implement educational policy reform to reconstruct Timor-Leste's education system. Millo et al. (2004, p. 721) regard this period as a 'missed opportunity' due to unsurmountable infrastructure loss and UNTAET's status as an illegitimate and unpopular form of governance. The World Bank estimates that 95 percent of educational infrastructure, furniture and materials were looted or burned, and 70-80 percent of senior administrators and secondary staff were forcedly deported to West Timor, in the weeks following the referendum (Millo et al. 2004). The education budget following 1999 was entirely sourced from external funds. During the first two years UNTAET abolished school fees and installed a national feeding program, raising enrolment rates to 70 percent, up from 51 percent prior to 1999 (Nicolai 2006). Infrastructure construction was prioritised, neglecting curriculum structuring and teacher training (Nicolai 2006). UNTAET education reconstruction efforts have been acknowledged as moderately successful, however, their local perception as an impositional government restrained its efficacy. Appendix VII presents additional post-conflict education theory.

4.4 PRIVATE-SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

A key determinant in reducing the risk of resurgence of conflict in a post-conflict setting is to ensure stable livelihoods. Kusago (2005) argues for 'pro-poor' growth, as generated through participatory approaches, rather than macroeconomic industry-led 'trickle down' policies. He recognises that private-sector development is essential to re-establishing stable livelihoods while strengthening national economic stability. Timor-Leste's National Development Plan recognised this imperative, but failed to substantiate private-sector development to the necessary extent (Kusago 2005). Fieldwork conducted by Kusago (2005) in 2003 found four key issues affecting private-sector development in Timor-Leste: poor infrastructure and wage distortion, financial resource constraints, inadequate product marketing for exports, and weak production and business skills. Based upon good development practice in Cambodia, Kusago (2005)

recommends investing in human resources (vocational training), supporting micro enterprises through micro-financing, utilising home and market-based food stalls, and strengthening domestic support for Timorese goods until stable international markets are sought.

Democracy has now been formally installed in Timor-Leste, yet few citizens are capable of defining what democracy entails and what it has to offer (Allden 2007). Many citizens assumed that democracy prescribed development, security and justice whilst failing to understand the importance of elections in a democratic society (Allden 2007). This ill alignment between societal expectations, knowledge and western-democratic installation signifies a profound lack of communication between the UN mandate and the East Timorese.

4.5 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

According to the World Bank (Mckechnie 2003), there are four ways to create capacity in post-conflict countries: to build capacity, to buy capacity, to build temporary capacity, or to bypass weak government capacity. The Bank regards best practice as building upon what already exists and buying capacity through contracting services only when necessary (Mckechnie 2003). UNTAET's experience in Timor-Leste directly defied best practice procedure, deciding from the outset to bypass existing governance structures and use almost entirely international staff to build capacity. This led to poor initial reconstruction efforts and extended economic and political turmoil.

UNTAET's failure to build legitimacy as an interim form of governance, presents several key lessons.

1. Institution building depends heavily upon leadership, requiring legitimacy through deep roots into society, accountability and integrity.
2. Incentives are imperative in ensuring staff remain at work and lowering corruption rates.
3. Capacity should be built upon what already exists; physical infrastructure, governance systems

(Mckechnie 2003)

SECTION FIVE

TOURISM

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Few economic activities exist that can match tourism in terms of potential impacts, both positive and negative, upon economic development, culture, and the environment. Tourism is often accompanied by infrastructure development, historical preservation in the form of museums and refurnishing of temples, cultural deterioration, pollution, and ecological damage (Chow 2005). As a development tool in a post-conflict setting, tourism has been proven to provide economic diversification and regeneration, poverty relief, stability, social integration and peace (Novelli et al. 2012 and Donaldson 2007). Tourism is capable of generating heightened understanding between divided communities in post-conflict settings, strengthening the peace process and furthering conflict cessation.

5.2 HILL-TREKKING IN NORTHERN THAILAND

Tourist trekking among the hill tribes of northern Thailand has been steadily expanding over the past four decades, offering the tribes a new source of income. Between 1989 and 1991, Dearden (1991) interviewed 208 persons at guesthouses in Chiang Mai and Ban Sop Kai, small villages along trekking routes. Tourism in the hill-tribe region can be divided into two categories: well-developed structured village tours and overnight jungle trekking between isolated villages. Dearden noted a particular cycle regarding the emergence of tourism, as described in Appendix VIII. Tourism income is derived from accommodation, handicrafts, transport, begging, and miscellaneous services (Dearden 1991). As of 1991, there were over 100,000 trekkers visiting Thailand annually, contributing an additional US$2 million to hill-tribe incomes (Dearden 1991). Similarly, Clark (2001) demonstrated the benefits of tourism amongst the subsistence agricultural economies of indigenous peoples in the Banaue rice terraces in the Cordillera Mountains, Philippines, and in the Sa Pa Valley of Vietnam. In both regions, tourism created jobs in the manufacturing of handicrafts, accommodation and catering (Clarke 2001). Tourism has effectively reduced opium dependency as a consumable product and as a cash crop in northern Thailand (Dearden 1991). Additionally, it provides hill-tribes with a sense of Thai-nationality, despite their illegitimate status, and opens the hill-tribes to the Western World (Dearden 1991). Small changes such as the adoption of wearing t-shirts, signify a desire for modernity and association with the outside world.

In addition to the well-documented degradative environmental effects of tourism, there have been “insidious societal changes” attributed to the practice in northern Thailand (Dearden 1991, p.400). Hill-tribes often choose to abandon their native dress and cultural practices as their exposure to Western culture increases. Consumables brought in for tourist consumption often end up being consumed by the locals, increasing household consumption.

5.3 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Since 1978 China has significantly changed its approach to economic development, shifting from a centralised, inward-looking development model to outward export-orientation. The opening of China to external markets, foreign commodities, and foreign direct investment, has contributed to China's dramatic economic growth over the last three decades. Jianmin suggests that three factors led to China's success: their bottom-up approach of decentralisation, gradualism, and their ability to pilot reforms for effectiveness before adopting them as national policy (WB 2011). China's development methodology initially focused on the coastal economic corridor ranging from Liaoning to Guangdong, though now the State has shifted its attention to new border regions, seeking new spaces of international economic cooperation to further its economic interests, increase regional security and reduce its dependence upon the East China Sea.

5.3.1 YUNNAN PROVINCE

Yunnan Province is located in southwest China, a mountainous frontier bordering Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam; see Figure 4. The Province has been a continuous battleground between Han Chinese forces and minority groups; both sides trying to consolidate power over the last two millennia (Su 2013). Most recently, Yunnan was utilised as a military frontline in the 1970s during the China-Vietnam war (Su 2013). In July 2009, Chinese President Hu Jintao urged Yunnan to take advantage of its geographic proximity, repositioning from a peripheral frontier to a strategic bridgehead to Southern Asia (Su 2013). Jintao hopes to consolidate China's economic ties to the South, securing a modern day 'silk-road' through to Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, India and the Bay of Bengal. Where 30 years ago the region lacked roads and access routes, it now has highways, rail and air links to the rest of China and neighbouring countries. Yunnan has been transformed from a secluded minority populated military frontline into an economic hub of exchange and multi-national cooperation (Su 2013).

Figure 4: People's Republic of China (University of Texas 2011)

These developments were followed by a sharp increase in tourism, with 760,000 international tourists visiting the province in 1998, generating US$261 million (Chow 2005). Yunnan is a highly diverse province, with ethnic minorities accounting for over a third of the population (Chow 2005). The entailing cultural diversity and province's natural beauty have allowed Yunnan to establish itself as a cultural haven, hidden in the far depths of Southwestern China. The exotic image that has been attached to Yunnan has grown the tourism industry to become a major source of revenue for the province. The tourism boom has generated many new jobs, such as travel agents, entertainers,

hotel clerks and assistants, cooks, stage performers, transport workers and gift shop attendants (Chow 2005).

In 1993, a team fielded by the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences and the University of California, Davis, conducted fieldwork in Lijiang Autonomous County, Yunnan Province (Ives 1994). The objective of the study was "to produce and test guidelines for the sustainable development of mountain regions with ethnic minorities" (Ivan 1994). It involved interviews and surveying amongst the Yi and Naxi villages. Since 1985 there has been a noted influx of tourists to the region, especially prevalent in the city of Lijiang. Many new buildings, such as tourist hotels and restaurants, were constructed and temples and museums were rehabilitated. The study concluded that tourism had a general positive effect upon the region and locals viewed tourism as an important opportunity, hoping to benefit from future tourism in Tiger-Leap Gorge (Ives 1994). Locals, however, commented upon the scattering of garbage in tourist areas, worried that increased tourism could lead to environmental degradation and livestock losses (Ives 1994). Tourism has also led to conflicts within communities, but community management of the process has proven to limit the likelihood of competition resulting in conflict (D.N 1994).

Donaldson (2007) investigated the differing tourism strategies of Yunnan and Guizhou. His research found that the effect of tourism upon alleviating poverty depended on whether the tourism industry was designed to include or exclude the participation of poor people. Yunnan experienced far greater economic growth over the study period than Guizhou; however, Guizhou's rural poverty rates were considerably lower than Yunnan's (Donaldson 2007). Donaldson contributes the difference to both Province's tourism policies. While Yunnan's tourism industry was greater in volume and budget, its structure catered towards the elite, steadily reducing the available jobs for unskilled locals in favour of outsourced specialised workers (Donaldson 2007). Economic benefits failed to trickle down to the impoverished. Guizhou, by contrast, developed a smaller tourism sector for backpackers and hill trekkers, allowing tourists to stay with host families (Donaldson 2007). The small-scale operations were highly participatory and contributed to poverty alleviation in the province.

5.3.1.1 ETHNIC CULTURAL DETERIORATION

The presence of tourism has led to the depletion of ethnic cultures. In Xishuangbanna, for example, tourism has increased the influence of both Han and Western cultures, depleting the ethnic culture of the Dai nationality by selling counterfeit goods and adopting Western practices (Chow 2005). The degree of marginality experienced among ethnic minorities has also risen. Often the only work ethnic minorities can obtain is menial work in the service industry, often catering for Han tourists. This perpetuates ethnic stereotyping and marginalisation. Chow (2005) suggests that fair practice should require ethnic minorities to choose whether to become involved in tourism and should be informed that to do so may partially materialise their cultures.

A case study conducted by Yang (2011) at Yunnan Ethnic Folk Villages, an ethnic theme park, mirrored Chow's conclusions. Yang posed eleven questions to the park employees to gauge their perceptions of tourism and its impacts; see Figure 5. His surveying concluded that ethnic tourism brings many benefits to the host community and despite the 'watering down' of some cultural practices to appease tourists, the practice has also resulted in economically motivated cultural preservation (Yang 2011). His findings also demonstrated the marginalising effects of service-level employment amongst minorities, whom were often excluded from management positions. Yang (2008) suggests that future tourism planning should concede greater control to the ethnic locals and increased public participation in decision-making processes.

Figure 5: Survey results from Yunnan Ethnic Folk Village (Yang 2011, pp. 326,327)

Tourism development**		Disagree %	Neutral/ Don't know %	Agree %	Mean score
Promotes local economic development	Han	0.0	0.0	31.7	4.01
	Minorities	0.0	0.8	67.5	4.36
	Total	0.0	0.8	99.2	4.25
Provides more job opportunities	Han	0.4	18.3	12.9	3.41
	Minorities	0.0	28.8	39.6	3.58
	Total	0.4	47.1	52.5	3.53
Improves living standards	Han	8.8	7.5	15.4	3.21
	Minorities	2.5	33.8	32.1	3.43
	Total	11.3	41.3	47.5	3.36
Increases awareness of minority culture	Han	0.0	8.3	23.3	4.14
	Minorities	0.4	0.4	67.5	4.12
	Total	0.4	8.7	90.8	4.13
Enhances cultural pride and ethnic identity	Han	8.8	7.1	15.9	3.43
	Minorities	0.0	5.8	62.5	4.01
	Total	8.8	12.9	78.4	3.83
Promotes cultural development of ethnic groups	Han	0.0	8.3	23.4	3.96
	Minorities	0.0	0.4	68	4.27
	Total	0.0	8.7	91.4	4.18
Contributes to cultural preservation	Han	0.0	0.0	31.7	4.45
	Minorities	0.0	9.2	59.2	4.10
	Total	0.0	9.2	90.9	4.21
Increases cultural assimilation	Han	15.9	1.3	14.6	2.91
	Minorities	15.8	48.3	4.2	2.79
	Total	31.7	49.6	18.8	2.83
Negatively impacts simple and friendly folk custom	Han	2.1	5.8	23.7	3.86
	Minorities	5.8	21.7	40.8	3.51
	Total	7.9	27.5	64.5	3.62
Negatively impacts local festivals or cultural events	Han	17.5	8.3	5.8	2.80
	Minorities	43.7	10.4	14.2	2.60
	Total	61.2	18.7	20.0	2.66
Increases competitions/ conflicts within an ethnic group and/or among ethnic groups	Han	9.2	5.8	16.7	3.37
	Minorities	48.4	11.7	8.3	2.24
	Total	57.6	17.5	25.0	2.60

5.4 TOURISM MANAGEMENT

Novelli et al. (2012) warn that *ad hoc* tourism policy and development may lead to a capacity deficit, with state provisions unable to match its aspirations. In Burundi (Novelli et al. 2012) and Bosnia & Herzegovina (Causevic et al. 2013), research has determined the countries' lack of strategic policy and poor coordination as the two main reasons for their failing tourism sectors. Effective tourism development requires stakeholders to understand the associated complexities and benefits, widespread cohesion between stakeholders in the form of a regulatory body, infrastructure development, formal licensing agreements, and the development of basic entrepreneurial skills (Novelli et al. 2012). Croatia, for example, chose to incorporate tourism into its state-driven economic policy, attracting large foreign investments (Novelli et al. 2012). Their centralised management approach and large investments in promotion and re-imaging helped transform Croatia into one of the most popular tourist destinations in Europe, voted the world's top tourist destination in 2005 by the Lonely Planet Guide (Causevic et al. 2013). Stability is also a requirement to fostering tourism; tourists will choose to avoid an area perceived as dangerous and may attribute political instability and brutality as possible threats.

CONCLUSION

At present, there is a distinct gap between development policy and its implementation. Operationalising donor policy, such as the Paris Declaration and FSPs, has proven difficult, with actors struggling to translate policy into effective practices (Baranyi et al. 2012). So while there is now general agreement among stakeholders about the need for context specific approaches, there remains difficulty concerning best implementation methodology. There is donor and academic consensus concerning several facets of best practice in post-conflict settings. Guiding principles and development rhetoric stress the importance of long-term conflict cessation and context-appropriateness. Early intervention, consistent funding and sustained long-term support are also promoted as essential components of best practice.

The case studies presented in this report demonstrate the need for economic growth and private-sector development. While formerly the development community emphasised neo-liberal reforms in post-conflict settings, there has been a paradigm shift towards community-based development and participatory approaches. Capacity can be obtained through a variety of mechanisms, though the experience of Timor-Leste demonstrates that capacity should be built upon systems already in place.

The emergence of strong tourism sectors in recovering countries indicates the industry's potential for strengthening economies and fostering peace. Participatory tourism caters for pro-poor growth, allowing the benefits to trickle down to more people. Tourism, however, has the potential to cause conflict, environmental degradation and cultural deterioration. Proper development should seek to avoid these challenges through incorporating locals into the planning process and forming organisational bodies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are intended for use by the IID to assist them with future engagement in Myanmar.

- The IID should incorporate the Paris Declaration, FSPs and New Deal Principles into their work, though they need to be mindful of their limitations. The principles represent ideal development practice and should only be used as a guide as realities present on the ground may restrict full implementation.
- Post-conflict development should prioritise maintaining ceasefire agreements and treat each development project as unique.
- Existing infrastructure, institutions, and forms of governance should be strengthened and built upon to facilitate capacity development and legitimacy.
- CDD and participatory development should be utilised to create employment opportunities and facilitate community governance, vocational skills, tourism, education and health provision.
- Development projects need to provide constant funding and sustained long-term support to increase their chances of success.
- Myanmar is in an opportune position to vastly expand its tourism industry. The intrigue that many Westerners feel towards Myanmar upon its 'reopening' to tourists should be capitalised upon. For example, tourism plans for Golden Boten City, near the China-Laos border, use the Golden Triangle aura of crime, mystery and opulence as a major selling point (Nyiri 2012). Small-scale participatory tourism as shown in northern Thailand and Guizhou should be incorporated into future development projects.
- While this report examined a variety of approaches, it could benefit from additional research into minority development in post-conflict areas. There exists a breadth of research into Southeast Asia minority development. Further research could begin with reports and journals by Minority Rights Group International.
- There is a distinct absence of rhetoric concerning environmental management in a post-conflict setting. Further research should investigate the effects of conflict upon the environment and the role the environment plays in post-conflict development.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I List of OECD Member Countries

As of 2013, the OECD member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, while also being assisted by the Commission of the European Communities (OECD 2013).

APPENDIX II The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action

The Paris Declaration represents a formal international effort to improve the effectiveness of aid. Partnerships between donors and partner countries adhere to the following five principles:

- Ownership- Partner countries exercise leadership over policies and actions;
- Alignment- Donors are required to align the support with the partner country's strategies, institutions and procedures;
- Harmonisation- Donor's actions must be more transparent and harmonized;
- Managing for Results- Managing resources and decision making by focusing on results;
- Mutual Accountability- Donors and partners are both equally accountable for results (AusAID 2010).

The AAA works alongside the Paris Declaration to track progress and commit donors and partner countries to undertake actions that help achieve the Paris targets. The following three areas of improvement form the basis of the AAA:

- Ownership- Partner countries require a higher degree of ownership, leadership and country systems/ institutions;
- Inclusive Partnerships- All partners are required to participate fully
- Delivering Results- Aid must be focused on measurable results that impact upon development (OECD 2013a).

APPENDIX III AusAID's Approach to Post-Conflict Development

Figure 6: AusAID'S aims and objectives in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations (AusAID 2011, p.2)

APPENIX IV FSPs Global Report Findings

Table 3: Implementation results of the FSPs (OECD 2011)

Fragile State Principle	Findings	Recommendations
1. Take context as the starting point **Understanding the specific context in each country is essential. Donors must recognise the different constraints pertaining to capacity, political will and governance. There should be a mix of aid instruments and an avoidance of blue-print approaches.**	Despite context recognition, few donors adopted regular and systemic analyses. International actors have attempted to apply previously designed development plans instead of consulting with recipient countries and tailoring assistance to the local realities. The lack of donor understanding of needs and context has impeded programming effectiveness.	• Increased use of local knowledge • Improve understanding of sub-national context. • Share analysis more widely. • Support national statistical development.
2. Do no harm **Appropriate safeguards should be implemented to reduce the chance of inadvertent societal divisions, corruption and abuse.**	Development partners fail to systematically ensure context-sensitive interventions. Numerous programs have resulted in ill-managed brain drain, salary differentials, reliance upon parallel structures, reliance upon NGOs, poor management of aid funds, and the bypassing of human rights and environmental codes.	• Interventions need to include systematic risk analysis using regular monitoring and feedback mechanisms. • Increased dialogue and adaption following governance concerns. • Attempt to procure goods and services locally.
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective **Efforts to build and maintain a strong relationship between the state and society should be prioritised, strengthening political will, legitimacy, accountability and**	Donors have shown commitment to statebuilding, but have not adequately supported government institutions fostering state-society relations. Support has remained centralised, focusing at the executive level without branching out	• Build support for a common vision of the state and the public. • Adopt a broader statebuilding approach that incorporates more decentralized administrations.

capacity. Emphasis in these areas will result in citizen confidence, trust and engagement.	into legislature, judiciary and decentralised administrations. There has been a lack of support for local organisations.	• Ensure aid does not undermine statebuilding processes.
4. Prioritise prevention **Future conflict prevention strategies should be implemented early and targeted at those areas with the highest instability. Prevention also includes risk analysis; moving towards long-term solutions that target the root cause of state fragility.**	Efforts to prevent conflict remain weak. Too few countries have implemented early warning systems and swift response mechanisms and regular evaluations. A lack of sharing risk analysis has prevented effective joint action and dialogue.	• Adopt an overall country framework for prevention using increased co-ordination. • Reduce the delay between early warning and response. • Strengthen local capacities.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives **Each sphere is interdependent, sharing tensions and trade-offs between objectives. These issues must be addressed when implementing strategies and policy. At the national level, a 'whole-of-government' approach is needed, ensuring coherence between ministries.**	Donor recognition of the links has not translated into evenly reflected country strategies. 'Whole-of-government' approaches lack formality, practicality and integration. Many partners have also failed to analyse the trade-offs between political, security and development objectives.	• Adopt whole-of-government approaches coupled with clear approaches to managing trade-offs. • Create national planning frameworks that incorporate partner government institutions.
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies **To prevent discrimination leading to delivery failures, international interventions should promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights.**	Development partners have displayed commitment to the principle, resulting in general non-discriminatory development. Extra attention to gender equality and female participation is still warranted.	• Increase attention given to supporting government policy regarding non-discrimination. • Ensure equitable support to human rights, the disabled and unemployed.
7. Align with local priorities in different	In each country there was a noted attempt to align with	• Strengthen national planning and

ways in different contexts **International actors should align behind government strategies and provide capacity when appropriate. Assistance should avoid undermining national institution building, giving thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity building. Functioning systems within existing local institutions should be identified and strengthened.**	local priorities. However, in some circumstances participating countries expressed concern regarding donor contributions failing to align with local priorities.	implementation capacity. • Strengthen national public financial management capacity to ensure better use of the national budget.
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors **Cooperation in the form of joint donor offices, agreed upon division of labour and multi-donor trust funds, allow multiple actors to engage in upstream analysis, joint assessments and shared strategies.**	Development partner coordination remains weak and informal. The sharp influx of development actors to some countries has resulted in inefficiency. Most countries lack an inclusive co-ordination structure for international actors and the state. Development actor objectives have often conflicted with state objectives, hampering strategic alignment and reducing development capacity.	• Provide support for government-led mechanisms and co-ordination. • Create development partner co-ordination arrangements; this will ensure that the division of labour is agreed upon prior to implementation.
9. Act fast . . . but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance **Assistance should be flexible, able to assist for the appropriate duration. Capacity development requires a longer commitment, especially given the volatile nature of fragile states.**	Donors have uniformly expressed their commitment yet often prioritise short-term objectives. A common donor issue is a lack of patience and resources, preventing long-term assistance while favouring quicker 'solutions' that often undermine national ownership and capacity.	• Develop clear transition plans. • Increase transparency of aid projects and aims; this allows for increased predictability of aid timelines.

10. Avoid pockets of exclusion **Approaches need to address demographic and geographic variations, appropriating attention and resources to the often neglected sectors within societies.**	Greater transparency is needed to help allocate aid according to where it is most needed. Extra attention needs to be given to geographic pockets of exclusion.	• Increase dialogue concerning reaching neglected regions and demographics. • Provide geographic aid breakdowns.

APPENDIX V World Bank Post-Conflict Principles

Table 4. The World Bank principles for engagement in fragile counties (World Bank 2011, p. 21).

1. **The World Bank's engagement with FCS flows from its mandate of poverty reduction.**
2. **The World Bank recognises that fragility and violence are long-term challenges emanating from an institutional inability to resolve internal and external stresses. This recognition requires a long-term commitment to support institution-building.**
3. **World Bank actions must be tailored to specific contexts, some requiring intensive local understanding.**
4. **World Bank work must be strongly anchored in a country's own preferences and leadership to ensure that the strategies are country-owned and more legitimate.**
5. **The World Bank is committed to work in full cooperation with other agencies, willing to secede responsibilities to others who have a comparative advantage in that given area.**

APPENIX VI World Bank Policy Tools

Table 5. Policy and program tools for engaging in fragile states (WB 2011, p. 17).

RESTORING CONFIDENCE

Signals: Future policy and priorities	Signals: Immediate actions	Commitment mechanisms	Supporting actions
• Citizen security goals • Key principles and realistic timelines for political reform, decentralization, corruption, transitional justice • Mix of state, community, NGO, and international capacity	• Participatory processes • Local security, justice, and development results • Credible appointments • Transparency in expenditures • Redeployment of security forces • Removal of discriminatory policies	• Independence of executing agencies • Independent third-party monitoring • Dual-key national-international systems • International execution of one or more key functions	• Risk and priority assessments • Communicating costs of inaction • Simple plans and progress measures on 2–3 early results • Strategic communication

TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS

Citizen security	Justice	Jobs and associated services
Foundational reforms and "best-fit" approaches		
Security sector reform: • Designed to deliver citizen security benefits • Capacity increases linked to repeated realistic performance outcomes and justice functions • Dismantling criminal networks through civilian oversight, vetting and budget expenditure transparency • Use of low-capital systems for rural and community policing	***Justice sector reform:*** independence and link to security reforms; strengthening basic caseload processing; extending justice services, drawing on traditional/community mechanisms ***Phasing anti-corruption measures:*** demonstrate national resources can be used for public good before dismantling rent systems; control capture of rents and use social accountability mechanisms	***Multisectoral community empowerment programs:*** combining citizen security, employment, justice, education, and infrastructure ***Employment programs:*** regulatory simplification and infrastructure recovery for private-sector job creation, long-term public programs, asset expansion, value chain programs, informal sector support, labor migration, women's economic empowerment, and asset expansion ***Humanitarian delivery and social protection:*** with planned transition from international provision ***Macroeconomic policy:*** focus on consumer price volatility and employment
Gradual, systematic programs		
• Phased capacity and accountability in specialized security functions	• Political and electoral reform • Decentralization • Transitional justice • Comprehensive anti-corruption reforms	• Structural economic reforms such as privatization • Education and health reforms • Inclusion of marginalized groups

NATIONAL ACTION TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL STRESS

Citizen security	Justice	Jobs and associated services
• Border cooperation • Military, police, and financial intelligence	• Coordinate supply and demand-side responses • Joint investigations and prosecutions across jurisdictions • Building links between formal/informal systems	• Pooled supplementary administrative capacity • Cross-border development programming

FEASIBLE RESULTS INDICATORS TO DEMONSTRATE OVERALL PROGRESS

	Citizen security	Justice	Jobs and associated services
Short term	• Violent deaths • Perception survey data on increases/ decreases in security	• Perception surveys by groups (ethnic, geographical, religious, class) on whether their welfare is increasing over time and in relation to others • Perception survey on trust in national institutions and on corruption	• Perceptions of whether employment opportunities are increasing • Price surveys (for real income implications)
Longer term	• Victim surveys	• Governance indicators refocused on outcomes and degree of progress within historically realistic timeframes • Household survey data on vertical and horizontal inequalities and access to justice services	• Household data on employment and labor force participation

APPENDIX VII Post-Conflict Education

Buckland (2006) suggests that post-conflict situations require early investment in education, decentralisation reforms and insurances that external support does not compete with state-led education. According to the World Bank, the provision of skills in post-conflict environments requires innovative delivery mechanisms to overcome deficiencies in security, infrastructure and teachers (Iyer et al. 2012). Donors can contribute by providing training or funds to improve educational infrastructure and resources. 'School in a box' kits and mobile educational programming have been proven effective in camps, settlements and situation where high volumes of internally displaced people were present. To circumvent security concerns during transitional periods, community and home-based education programs allow training and schooling to take place without exchanges between former adversaries.

Nepal, in 2001, revolutionised their education system by re-naming all government schools as community schools. The amendment to the Education Act empowered communities to take over management duties, allowing students and teachers to avoid altercations with those fighting in the war. By 2004, community-driven schools in high-conflict areas had higher enrolment rates than those in low-conflict areas. Community-based initiatives require a high degree of caution as school management committees can be coerced and influenced by local elites, potentially furthering social inequalities and tensions (Greely et al. 2006).

APPENDIX VIII Tourism cycles in Northern Thailand

According to Dearden (1991), tourist areas pass through a logistical life cycle as depicted in figure blah. Contacts between tourist operators and tribes headsman form upon an initial consultation. If a headsman trusts the guide trekkers are allowed to visit and stay in local houses with no payment expected. After this initial penetration, the number of trekkers increases resulting in payment in exchange for accommodation, food and handicrafts. This stage builds trust between the two parties, allowing additional trekkers to visit, increasing frequency from once a week to every night. Special infrastructure may be created and new consumables brought in to cater to the trekkers. Handicrafts are deliberately produced for sale to trekkers, as well as whisky and opium. At this stage of the cycle, problems may emerge. Villages may change their traditional ways to become more appealing to trekkers; however, this action may result in trekkers deeming the villages unauthentic. Additionally, locals may turn to begging to supplement their incomes, further taking away from the traditionalist village image. At this point tourism in the village can begin to decline, leaving the village void of its new source income, or rejuvenate their image to invigorate their image.

Figure 7. Depiction of tourism life cycle stages for hill-tribe villages in northern Thailand (Dearden 1991, p. 403).